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1 INTRODUCTION
At its spring 1991 meeting the Development
Committee of the World Bank and the IMF requested
a report on 'an overall legal framework which would
embody the essential legal principles so as to promote
FDI (foreign direct investment)'. Preparation of this
report was entrusted by the President of the World
Bank to a task force consisting of the General Counsel
of the World Bank (as chairman), the International
Finance Corporation (IFC) and the Multilateral
Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA).
In fulfilment of the request, the task force published 'A
Survey of Existing Instruments' constituting the
'Legal Framework for the Treatment of Foreign
Investment', which sought to identify general trends in
the prevailing use of these instruments. A second
document was then prepared comprising a draft report
to the Development Committee which incorporated a
set of 'Proposed Guidelines'. This document builds
upon the trends identified in the first document but
also takes into account what have been identified as
'prevailing best practices' by the World Bank Group as
well as the need to ensure 'broad international
acceptability'.
The potential influence and importance of the
Guidelines should be obvious. At a time when so many
LDCs are declaring it to be their intention to give a
more prominent role to private sector activities, and
when the role of FDI in private sector modernization
and growth is also being strongly urged, Guidelines
promulgated by the Development Committee are very
likely to become something approaching the required
standard practice. At the very least they will be
universally quoted as the prime reference point as to
what constitutes good governance in this area of the
state's activity.
This article proceeds as follows. Part 2 summarizes the
contents of the proposed Guidelines. Part 3 sets out the
range of undertakings and concessions which have
often been included in a LDC government's Foreign
Investment Code. Certain differences between the
Guidelines and what we have characterized as a
representative Code will be noted, but one striking
similarity is urged as being of greater importance.
Because of the terms of reference given to the task
force, the Guidelines, even more than most Codes,
concentrate upon a rather narrow range of legal issues
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and instruments. There is some danger in this. It is that
political leaders in certain developing countries
wanting to undertake market-led reforms will put in
place all the instruments recommended in the
Guidelines, and then feel dismayed and poorly-advised
by what follows - or fails to follow.
One can imagine only too easily the reaction: 'We have
done everything the Bank and the Fund urged us to do.
We have opened up our economies and introduced
these shining new investment Codes with all the
recommended provisions - but still the foreign
investment does not come, or comes only in a trickle'.
The ambitions of Parts 4 and 5 are to broaden the
perception after injecting a dose of realism into anyone
who might think that adherence to the Guidelines by
itself would be sufficient to satisfy most potential
foreign investors. Specifically Part 4 lists 22 additional
concerns that will be present in the investor's mind,
many of them more pressing than the items included in
the Guidelines. Part 5 suggests (if only by implication)
that the Development Committee should request a
report on the governance of the world economy, and a
code of conduct for international economic relations.
Improvements in these areas, it is argued, would do
more to encourage beneficial investment in the less
developed economies than even the wisest legal
Guidelines or Codes.
2 THE GUIDELINES
The Guidelines are professedly legal in character and
attempt to do no more than set out a framework of
principles that the individual host state may then
embody in its own laws, agreements, treaties,
regulations, etc. They do not, for instance, involve
themselves in issues relating to the preservation of
national culture (including the pattern of consumer
tastes), immigration, the distribution of domestic
income, or the appropriate dividing line between the
public and private sector. It is assumed that host
governments desire inward foreign investment and that
inward investors will comply completely and in good
faith with all local legal requirements. Nothing more is
said regarding the appropriate conduct of foreign
investors in the host state on the grounds that a set of
rules for this purpose has already been reflected in
negotiated provisions of the United Nations Centre on
Transnational Corporations (UNCTC) draft Code of
Conduct.
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The main areas which are covered are: (a) the admission
of foreign investment; (b) the treatment of foreign
investment, particularly in respect of the transfer of
capital and returns; (c) expropriation and unilateral
alterations or termination of contracts; and (d) the
settlement of disputes. In the following sections the
proposed Guidelines are summarized under these four
heads.
A The admission of foreign investment
Each state is expected to encourage and facilitate the
investment in its territory of capital, technology and
managerial skills by nationals of other states, whether
corporate or individual. Procedures, regulations and
conditions may be made by the host state governing
FDI, but these should not be unduly cumbersome or
complicated. Experience suggests (say the Guidelines)
that performance criteria such as minimum local
ownership, local employment or export targets,
although perceived to be in the national interest, are
often counterproductive in that they either discourage
foreign investors or give rise to evasion and corruption.
Unrestricted admission, save for certain listed
investments which would either be prohibited or would
need screening and licensing, is commended as a more
effective approach. Notwithstanding this general
approach, a state may reserve certain investments for
its own nationals or may refuse a proposed investment
considered to be contrary to the interests of national
security, public health or public order, the protection
of the environment, or simply unconducive to its
economic development. Each state is encouraged to
publish and publicize regularly-updated information
regarding its legislation, regulations and procedures
affecting FDI, including an indication of those classes
of investment which are prohibited, subject to
screening and licensing, or reserved for nationals.
B The treatment of private foreign investments
The first underlying principle proposed is that, in
respect of the legal protection of their person, their
property (including intellectual property) and their
rights and in the grant of permits, licences,
authorizations, visas, etc., the treatment of foreign
invèstors should not be less favourable than that
accorded by the State to national investors. In similar
vein, the host State should not discriminate among
foregn investors on grounds of nationality. The second
underlying principle is that the State should not refrain
from doing anything within its own competence that
may be necessary for the efficient and uninterrupted
operation of the approved investment. This extends to
the prompt issuance of licences and permits, and
authorization for the employment of foreign personnel
- although the State may reasonably require the
investor to establish his inability to recruit locally
before he resorts to recruiting abroad.
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With regard to the transfer of funds abroad, the host
State should freely allow transfer of the net revenues
realized from the investment (subject to the exceptions
authorized under the Articles of Agreement of the IMF
or in relevant treaties) and of such sums as may be
necessary to discharge all due obligations, including the
servicing and repayment of contracted debts. On
liquidation or sale of the investment, the investor
should be allowed to repatriate the proceeds
immediately or, where the State faces foreign exchange
stringencies, over a period not exceeding five years with
interest at the normal commercial rate accruing upon
retained funds until such time as the transfer is actually
effected. Foreign personnel employed should be
allowed to transfer regularly a reasonable part of their
salaries and wages and, upon termination of their
employment, should be allowed an immediate transfer
of all savings from such salaries and wages. The
Guidelines make it clear that the transfers provided for
above should be made at the market rate of exchange at
the time of the transfer.
Consistent with much modern advice, the Guidelines
do not suggest that a host State should provide foreign
investors with tax exemptions and other fiscal
incentives. Reasonable and stable tax rates are
considered to provide a better incentive. Competition
amongst host States in providing tax exemptions is
particularly deplored. Again in line with most modern
thinking, where incentives are deemed to be justified,
the advice is that they should preferably be granted
automatically, linked to the type of activity which the
State particularly seeks to encourage, and should be
available equally to national investors in similar
circumstances. As something of an afterthought, the
Guidelines do commend fiscal incentives that are
provided by the investors' own government (presumably
an OECD country) for the purpose of encouraging
investment in developing countries.
C Expropriation and unilateral alterations or
termination of contracts
The Guidelines state that a host State may not
expropriate or nationalize in whole or in part a foreign
private investment, or take measures which have a
similar effect, except where this is in pursuance in good
faith of a public purpose, is done in accordance with
applicable legal procedures without discrimination on
the basis of nationality and against the payment of
appropriate compensation. Most of the rest of this
section deals with a discussion of what principles
should be applied to determine that such compensation
is 'appropriate'.
Compensation will generally be considered appropriate
if it is based upon the fair market value of the asset
taken and is paid without undue delay. But how is 'fair
market value' to be determined in the absence of an
actual agreed sale between a willing buyer and a willing
seller?
The Guidelines suggest three different criteria. For a
going concern with established profitability, fair value
may be based on a discounted net cash flow calculation
taking account of risk, the expected rate of inflation and
the time value of money. The rate of return available in
the same market on investments of a comparable
character may also be taken as a guide. For an
enterprise which has not been profitable, liquidation
value (i.e. the realizable value of the assets minus
unavoidable liabilities) may be used. For other
nationalized assets - those which are neither steadily
profitable nor consistent loss-makers - fair market
value may be estimated on the basis of the replacement
cost of the assets taken or, if a market valuation has
recently been written into the accounts, on the basis of
book value.
Compensation should also be effective, in the sense of
being paid in a currency of use to the investor, and paid
either promptly or, if the State faces foreign exchange
difficulties, in instalments over a period not exceeding
five years provided that market-related interest in the
currency of compensation should apply to all deferred
payments.
Where comprehensive non-discriminatory nationali-
zations are embarked upon under circumstances of
war, revolution or similar exigencies, the Guidelines
suggest that compensation may be more appropriately
determined by government-to-government negotiations
(between the host State and the investors' home States)
rather than through negotiations with individual
companies. Should such government-to-government
negotiations fail, international arbitration is proposed.
D Settlement of disputes
The Guidelines state as a matter of observed fact that
most disputes between private foreign investors and
the host State are settled by negotiation between them,
through recourse to the host State's courts or through
other agreed mechanisms)
The Guidelines in fact stop short of recommending
that host States agree to independent arbitration
(which, in the circumstances of a FDI will normally
mean international arbitration) should local remedies
fail. What they do instead is to define independent
What the Guidelines do not state is that just because a settlement is
eventually agreed, that does not mean that the outcome is regarded as
fair or satisfactory either by the government or by the investor; it is
just as likely to mean that the costs of extending the dispute are
regarded by at least one party as potentially unbearable.
2 Keynes, who played such a large role in founding those same
institutions, once wrote: 'I sympathize, therefore, with those who
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arbitration as a process agreed to by the State and the
investor or between the host State and the investor's
home State where the majority of arbitrators are not
solely appointed by one party to the dispute. Where
independent arbitration is agreed to, the Guidelines
encourage states to have recourse to the International
Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes
(ICSID) if the State is a party to the ICSID
Convention, or to seek arbitration through the 'ICSID
Additional Facility' if the host State is not a party to the
ICSID Convention.
What are we to make of these guidelines emanating
from one of the world's most powerful and influential
institutions? A first impression is how stilted and
narrow they are. Well, any document drafted mainly by
lawyers responsible to an international constituency is
likely to be stilted and, in some places, deliberately
ambiguous. A major reason for the Guidelines'
narrowness stems from their concentration almost
entirely upon a restricted range of legal instruments
rather than upon a State's policies and the wider
culture of the host country's society. In this they
duplicate the provisions of most developing countries'
'Investment Codes' and may well be running the
danger of inspiring a similar sense of disappointment
and disillusion.
But there is another reason why the document conveys
an impression of narrowness, or lack of historical
depth. Certainly it is the current prevailing wisdom
within the Washington institutions that a greater flow
of FDI will benefit the world in general and the
economics of developing countries in particular,
'improving the long term efficiency of the host country
through greater competition, transfer of capital,
technology and managerial skills and enhancement of
market access'. These surely are matters of considerable
potential benefit. But intellectual fashions have a habit
of going too far, and it is perhaps as well to remind
ourselves that enthusiasm for large-scale international
financial flows has not always been unmitigated - even
by those who played a large role in founding those same
Washington institutions 2
3 INVESTMENT CODES
A typical code, with its accompanying legislation and
guide, would be likely to include the range of
undertakings and concessions indicated in Table 1.
would minimize rather than those who would maximize, economic
entanglements among nations. Ideas, knowledge, science,
hospitality, travel - these are the things which should of their nature
be international. But let goods be homespun wherever it is reasonably




automatic import permissions accorded;
exemption from import duties for plant and equipment;




tax holiday or partial rebate of tax;
permission to carry forward capital allowances to beyond tax holiday
period;
indefinite carry forward of losses;
rebate of income tax to extent of social security contributions paid on
behalf of local employees;
deferment or partial rebate;
an approved foreign investment will be permitted to raise finance
from domestic sources in proportion to the size of the foreign capital
provided;
permission to operate an external account; or
an externally-denominated account at Central Bank;
right to retain a certain proportion of foreign earnings in an external
account;
automatic visas and work permits for approved number of expatriate
personnel;
proportion of remuneration allowed to be remitted;
value of certain approved benefits and allowances not subject to
income tax, or taxed at a reduced rate;
savings accumulated out of local earnings can be repatriated at end of
contract;
exemption from Alien Employment Tax for expatriates working on
priority projects;
a guarantee that the tax rate applicable to the income of the
enterprise will not rise above a stipulated rate;
guarantee of full remittability of profits attributable to the
investment and of dividends declared;
guaranteed transfer of full servicing payments for approved foreign
loans;
remittability of royalties, fees, charges for technology transfer as
provided for by the Investment Code;
permission to remit capital in the event of sale or liquidation of the
enterprise, or of an interest in it attributable to foreign investment;
if all or part of the production is destined for the domestic market,
the enterprise may be offered tariff protection against imports for a
specified number of years;
establishment or production license will be granted as appropriate;
where the industry qualifies for pioneer status (i.e. produces a
product new to the country), an undertaking may be given that no
further license for production of the same product will be issued for a
stipulated number of years;
no enterprise approved under the code shall be expropriated or
nationalized;
no person owning all or part of the capital of approved enterprise
shall be obliged to part with the interest to another person;
the investor may have recourse against the government in the local
courts in the event of the terms under which the enterprise operates
being changed in a discriminatory manner to the disadvantage of the
investor;
in the event of a dispute with the government not being settled
through amicable negotiation or satisfactorily through domestic
disputes settlement procedures, the dispute will be submitted to
binding international arbitration.
Item
1 Importation of essential (a)
machinery and equipment (b)
(c)
2 On value of investment (a)
(b)






5 Stamp duty and property
rates
(a)
6 Access to domestic
loans and credit
(a)
7 Foreign earnings (a)
(b)
8 Retentions (a)





10 Applicable tax rate (a)
11 Transfer of dividends,





12 Tariff protection (a)







16 Settlement of disputes (a)
There are a number of significant contrasts between the
approach and content of the Guidelines and those of a
representative Foreign Investment Code (FIG). The
traditional FIG approach requires that all foreign
investment should be submitted to government and
need various approvals before the investment can be
made, quite apart from being necessary to gain any of
the proffered benefits or concessions. In line with the
general reappraisal of the importance of private sector
activities, the modern approach is to welcome the
inward investor of capital for any business activity
which is not prohibited by law, and not specifically
reserved for government or for nationals of the country.
No special consents or permissions would be required
for any such investment (any more than they would be
in the USA or the UK). Only if the foreign investor
seeks assurances or concessions which are not available
to the local investor (say on repatriation of profits and
capital, or settlement of disputes) does he need to make
application before making his investment. If such
assurances or concessions are granted, the foreign
investor may also be required himself to give certain
assurances or to abide by certain conditions (e.g. on
training and employment of nationals) that would not
be imposed on the domestic investor. Otherwise the
trend is to treat foreign and domestic investors on level
and even terms, neither extending any special
concessions to foreign investors that are not available to
domestic investors in the same sector nor discriminating
against the foreign investor.
It is a corollary of this approach that the Guidelines
come down against special tax holidays, accelerated
allowances, etc. for foreign investors only.
In those countries which are in the throes of a transition
from being centrally planned, command econQmies
into economies encouraging greater private ownership
and use of market mechanisms, a different situation
arises. Such societies do not already have in place any
sophisticated legal structure for dealing with private
sector business. For that reason China has felt the need,
since first welcoming foreign joint ventures in 1979, to
promulgate over a hundred statutory instruments -
some described as laws and some as regulations -
dealing not only with taxation and fiscal incentives but
also such topics as banking and loans, labour relations,
trademarks and patents, technology importation and
licensing, accountancy practices, arbitration and
bankruptcy.
4 OTHER MATTERS THAT WILL BE ON THE
INVESTOR'S MIND
What is striking about both the Guidelines and
representative Foreign Investment Codes is the extent
When in October 1992 North Korea published its first 22-clause
foreign investment law, Reuters reported the reaction of Japanese
business to be 'We need stable politics, good subcontractors and
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to which they ignore so many of the conditions that
most strongly influence direct foreign investors in
arriving at their investment decisions.3
What long-term foreign investors are primarily
interested in are the prospects of making profits
commensurate with the investment risk, the ability to
remit those profits after payment of reasonable tax, and
the long-term security of their investments. The
remainder of this section is devoted to listing
conditions more vital to these concerns in the mind of
the investor than many of the legal instruments and
considerations that are listed in the Guidelines and in a
characteristic Foreign Investment Code.
1 The country's track record in dealing with earlier
investors. Just as a good track record lowers the
supply price of capital in terms of the rate of return
that will be looked for, so a bad track record
inevitably puts the price up, however strong the
protestations of reform from the current
government.
2 How the domestic private sector is treated. This
will be the first enquiry a potential foreign investor
will make. The welcome extended to the foreign
investor will seem insincere if the domestic private
sector is repressed and discriminated against.
3 Exchange rate policy. An over-valued exchange
rate will be regarded as a form of additional tax by
any investor producing for export, while those
producing for the domestic market will suspect
that the resulting shortages will mean that
imported materials will be difficult to obtain and
dividends even more difficult to remit. Investors
prefer to see not only an exchange rate that is
realistic at the time of their investment, but one
that will automatically be adjusted to keep it
competitive.
4 An appropriate legal framework for business. This
implies a law of contract and a law of bankruptcy
and evidence that local courts do not discriminate
against foreigners.
5 Management of inflation. Rapid inflation adds to
costs and is usually evidence of a government's
inability to match its own revenues and
expenditures. It has the impact of an additional tax
upon individuals, especially those with savings. It
also has the technical effect of devaluing the
capital allowances of businesses, artificially
increasing their profits, and thus indirectly
increasing the real rate of taxation.
6 Adequate personal security. A high domestic
crime rate not only puts up the cost of doing
labour force, and trustworthiness to do business with other countries.
North Korea is lacking in such factors'. 'A sudden declaration of love
is a nuisance'.
business, it may also have the effect of influencing
the quality of businessmen that any intending
investor is able to employ.
7 Educational and health facilities. The quality of
these, whether provided by the host country's
public or private sector, has an important
influence on managements' decisions concerning
business location.
8 Reliable power supply. Few other factors can
disrupt production, make it difficult to meet
delivery commitments, raise costs and cut into
profits so severely as frequent and unanticipated
disruptions to the delivery of power.
9 Other infrastructure. Similar concerns will be
shown regarding the reliability and cost of rail and
harbour facilities, water supply, local trans-
portation for the workforce and, in particular,
telecommunications.
10 The quality of the labour force. Productivity is
perceived to depend not only on the
industriousness and adaptability of local workers
but also upon the reputation for being reasonable
(or otherwise) of the local trade unions.
11 Labour ordinances. These act as a deterrent when
they effectively give the Minister power to
determine who should be employed and upon
what terms and make dismissals subject to
government approval. Those which lay down
minimum standards and define the rights of trade
unions are usually accepted providing their
provisions are applied equally to foreign investors
and domestic producers.
12 The reliability of domestic suppliers and sub-
contractors. When the foreign investor is expected
to source his inputs from domestic producers,
particularly if they are parastatals and monopoly
suppliers, it is vital that those producers should be
able to supply promptly, competitively, and to the
required quality.
13 State marketing organizations (SMOs). A legal
requirement to sell final output to or through an
SMO will often act as a deterrent. Many SMOs
have a poor reputation for efficiency,
incorruptibility and prompt payment. In addition,
this requirement makes brand name establishment
more difficult and removes from the investor the
commercial rewards that might be expected from
achieving a higher quality of product than his
co-producers.
14 Price controls. The right to impose price controls
gives to the government rather than to the market
the power to determine an enterprise's profit-
ability or losses. A prime example of this is the
sugar industry where, especially when an election
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is imminent, governments have a strong incentive
to raise the price the factory is required to pay to
the cane grower while keeping down the price of
refined sugar that can be charged to the consumer.
Where price controls are recognized as being
necessary, the investor will look for a formula that
is applied automatically, rather than be put in a
position where he is required to make a case-by-
case submission to some government authority.
15 Arbitrary decisions. These are anathema to
business confidence and make investment
planning very difficult, whether the arbitrariness
arises at top government level or in a junior district
official. The problem here is that the authority to
give orders has long been one of the privileges of
officials in one-party states. It is a surrender of
authority (i.e. to the rule of law, to the terms of a
contract, or simply to the market) that is not
always readily made.
16 Petty corruption cuts both ways. On the one hand
it may be seen as part of the local culture,
inevitable where public sector salaries are so low,
and something which facilitates the transaction of
business. On the other hand, a widescale
reputation for corruption will actually kill off the
prospects of certain businesses - a good example
would be certain countries' meat exports which
remain unacceptable in the USA, the EC and
Japan because everybody knows that a certificate
of hygiene can be purchased from some public
official whatever the state of the local abattoir.
17 Controlled interest rates. These almost always
imply rates that are held by government below the
level that the market would determine - usually
to reduce the cost of government's own
borrowings. For those who are able to take
advantage of them, controlled interest rates might
appear to act as an incentive to investment. In
practice they almost always lead to a rationing of
credit, an inefficient and bifurcated market, and,
for the foreign investor, severely limited access to
local credit at the controlled rate.
18 A unitary or mono-banking system. In no other
sector is suitably regulated competition more
important for the foreign investor (and indeed for
the domestic investor as well) than in the provision
of financial services. A monopoly commercial
banking service, which would inevitably be
controlled by government, gives bank officials
unrestrained power, provides no incentive
towards a modern, efficient service, and offers a
bank the temptation (which is seldom resisted) to
sit upon their customers' money for long periods
earning interest for the bank itself, even in such
simple matters as making international money
transfers.
19 Fair access to the domestic money market.
Investors will be concerned to see that in seeking
funds the private sector is given a fair opportunity
to compete. This can be prevented (and often is)
by regulations requiring that pension funds,
insurance companies, mutual funds, unit trusts,
etc. hold a high proportion of their funds in
government stock, thus limiting their discretion to
invest in equities. It can also be frustrated by
governments maintaining the interest rate on
Treasury bills so high that investors are bound to
hold them rather than equities.
20 A lively, but adequately regulated local stock
exchange. A foreign investor may reasonably, in
due course, wish to float a portion of his company.
He will look for an exchange that is neither over-
nor under-regulated. It was well said of the
Bombay Exchange that some of its worst abuses
flourished because the operations of the exchange
were over-regulated and under-supervised.
21 Protective tariffs which are not excessive. High
tariffs might initially seem to offer comfort to the
intending investor, especially if part of his output
is to be sold on the domestic market. But, in the
longer term, they embody two dangers: first, that
his domestic suppliers may supply inputs (equally
protected) that are of low quality and high cost;
second, that an eventual dismantling of the
protective apparatus as part of IMF/Bank
conditionality may leave his own project
unprepared for foreign competition.
22 Reasonable rate of personal income tax. Most
companies making a substantial foreign invest-
ment in a new project will want to see it managed,
at least in its early years, by someone on their own
pensionable pay-roll. Such employees, mainly
expatriate, will be on a salary several times higher
than the median salary in the host country,
especially if special allowances are treated as part
of taxable income. Because of the discrepancy in
general income levels as well as the tendency of
LDCs to have more sharply progressive tax rates
with higher maximum rates, the employee may
well find himself or herself assessed at twice the
rate that would have applied on an equivalent
income in his or her own domicile. To compensate
for this, the project will have to increase senior
expatriate salaries still further, a major proportion
of which will then pass straight through to the
government in personal income tax. This reduces
the viability of the project, and leads to prèssure by
all foreign investors to have the salaries of serving
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expatriate employees recognized as tax exempt.
Such exemptions are in principle undesirable; but
they are an inevitable consequence of high
marginal rates on personal incomes.
5 GOVERNANCE AND THE WORLD ECONOMY
The Guidelines have a limited aim, restricting
themselves to the consideration of what legal
instruments a government should introduce if it wishes
to create an economic environment encouraging to
foreign direct investment. As we have seen, these cover
only a small part of the spectrum of considerations that
will determine the foreign investor's decision.
Commentators from developing countries are certain
to be struck by the pronounced asymmetry in the
Development Committee's approach. While codifying
part of what may be said to constitute LDC good
governance towards the foreign investor, the
Development Committee has steered clear of dis-
cussion of some far more important determinants of the
level of beneficial foreign investment in developing
countries - namely, conditions in the world economy,
and what good governance exercised by the govern-
ments of the OCED countries could do to bring about
an improvement in the fair conduct of international
economic relations. Any such discussion would have to
deal, inter alia, with the following items:
practices amongst OECD governments that have
the effect of lowering the price of LDC commodity
exports;
world interest rates that push up the required rate of
return on LDC projects to a level that severely
reduces attractive investment opportunities;
an external debt overhang (with an increasing
proportion of it being owed to the International
Financial Institutions) that will clearly impede the
ability of many of the poorer LDCs to allow the free
remittability of interest or profits;
increased protectionism against LDC manu-
facturers;
the dumping of farm surpluses grown under
subsidized price regimes onto international markets
in a manner that damages the prospects (and often
destroys the profitability) of tropical producers;
the propagation of a new public morality which
insists that it is in the general interest that all factors
of production should become internationally
mobile, except one - unskilled labour.
